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THE LAV OF SUBTERRANEAN WATERS.
The law affecting water courses, so far as that term is ap-
plied to surface streams or water collected into bodies having
a known and visible course, may be regarded ab, by this
time, well and long settled, whether goverled by the
maxims of the common law Aqua currit, et debel currere, ut
solebat currere and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non ldas, from
which nearly, if not all, the rules affecting the use of water
in streams are derived ; or by the law existing in California
and perhaps in some of the other States, which recognizes
the right of appropriation as well as of use in water. Sub-
terranean waters, however, have, even of late years, been the
subject of considerable litigation; the law governing them
has been a matter of debate, and so far as it has been set-
tled, may be regarded as quite a modem head of juris-
prudence.
i. C/asses o/ Subterranean Waters.
Subterranean waters may be of two sorts; they may be
percolations, that term in law including percolations in the
strict sense and small undefined unknown streams, or they
may be underground rivers, such as exist in some limestone
regions, which differ from overground streams in scarcely
anything besides the fact that their course cannot be readily
discovered from the surface of the earth. Of streams of this
latter character we shall speak before the close of this article;
at present we turn our attention to the law governing perco-
lations, using that word in the sense suggested above and
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adopting the definition of WHITMA€, J., in Mosier v. Cald-
well (1872), 7 Nev. 363:
Any flowage of subsurface water other than that of a running stream
open, visible and dearly to be traced.
Which definition we may modify by striking out the words
"open" and "visible."
2. Ordinary rules governing water courses not aplicable
to percolating waters.
The ordinary rules of law, by which surface water rights
may be acquired by prescription, and according to which
their enjoyment must be regulated, do not apply to perco-
lgting waters. This rule, which is now fully recognized, is
laid down in many authorities; amongst others are: Act=m
v. Blundell (1843), 12 M. & W. 324; Greenleafv. Francis
(1836), 18 Pick. (Mass.) 117; Bassett v. Salisbury Mfanufac-
turing Co. (1862), 43 N. H. 569; Goodale v. Tuttle (1864),
29 N. Y. 459 ; Swell v, Cults (1870), 50 N. H. 439 ; Mfosier
v. Caldwell, supra.
3. The law recognizes no relative profrietary rights aris-
ing from preserzlion or exjure naturw.
Assuming, therefore, a knowledge on the part of the
reader of the ordinary law of surface water courses, we
proceed to notice what has been established with reference
to percolation, and to ascertain whether the fact that water
percolates through one man's property to that of another
gives rise to any mutual rights and obligations between the
two land-oivners.
It may be regarded as settled law that where water
merely percolates through the earth, and either feeds a well
or comes to the surface in a stream upon a piece of land
other than that through which it percolates, the owner of
said land has, ex jure naturae, no right to demand that the
percolations shall continue, and he cannot acquire such a
right otherwise than by contract; in other words,- the maxim,
Aqua currit, et debet currere, ut solebat currere, does not
apply to percolating water. When, therefore, a land-owner,
by an act upon his own land, cuts off the hidden and tin-
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known current of water, to the destruction of a well or a
stream upon the land of his neighbor, no action will lie.
This has been established as the rule, both in England and
America, after a course of litigation of considerable length
aiid extent In England, the first reported case upon the
subject is the nisiprius case of Balston v. Bensted (i8o8), i
Camp. 463, wherein Lord ELLENBOROUGH held that the right
to have a spring supplied by percolation could be acquired by
twenty years' exclusive enjoyment. The case, however, never
went any further, and a juror was withdrawn. As pointed
out in Chasemore v. Richards (r859), 7 H. of L. Cas. 365, by
WIGHTMAN, J., the holding was but the dictum of an emi-
nent judge, followed by no decision upon the point, and in
view of the, later decisions, Balston v. Bensted might have
been included by Lord CAMPBELL in that famous fifth
volume, which he sometimes threatened to publish, of "bad
Ellenborough law." Whether the right to the supply of a
well by percolation could be acquired was, however, treated as
an open question by Sir LANCELOT "SHADWELL, V. C., in
Hammond v. Hall (184O), 10 Sim. 551.
The question of the right in percolating waters came be-
fore the Exchequer Chamber in 1846, in Acon v. Blundell,
12 A. & 'V. 324. In that case, it appeared that in
1821, the predecessor in title of the plaintiff had sunk on
his land, a well for raising water for the working of his
cotton mill, and that between 1837 and 184o, the defendants
had, on the land of one of their number, sunk two coal
pits, the effect of which was to so far diminish the supply to
the plaintiff's well as to render it useless for the purpose of
the cotton mill. It was held that an action could, not be
maintained for the injury to the well. TINDAL, C. J., in
delivering the opinion of the Court said, alter adverting to
the law governing streams flowing, over the surface of the
land, and asserting that subterranean waters were not gov-
erned by the same rule:
The ground and origin of the law which governs streams running in
their natural course, would seem to be this, that the right enjoyed by the
several proprietors of the land over which they flow, is and always has
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been, public and notorious; that theenjoyment hasbeen long continued-
in ordinary cases, indeed, time out of mind-and uninterrupted, each
man knowing what he receives and what has always been received from
the higher lands, and what he transmits and what has always been trans-
mitted to the lower. The rule, therefore, either assumes as its founda-
tion the implied assent and agreement of the proprietors of the different
lands from all ages, or, perhaps, it may be considered as a rule of positive
law (which would seem to be the opinion of Fleta andofBlackstone), the
origin of which is lost by the progress of time; or it may'not be unfitly
treated, as laid down by Mr. Justice STORY in his judgment in the case of
Tyler v. Wilkinson [1827, 4 Mason 4o2], as "an incident of the land; and
that whoever seeks to found an exclusive use must establish a rightful ap-
propriation in some manner known and admitted by the law." But in th9
case of a well sunk by the proprietor in his own land, the water which
feeds it from a neighboring soil does not flow openly in the sight of the
neighboring proprietor, but through the hidden veins of the earth beneath
its surface; no man can tell what changes the underground sources have
undergone inthe progress of time; itmay well be that itis onlyyesterday's
date that they first took the course and direction which enabled them to
supply the well. Again no proprietor knows what portion of water is
taken from beneath his own soil, how much he gives originally, or how
much he transmits only, or how muchhe receives; on the contrary, until
the well is sunk and the water collected by draining into it, there cannot,
properly, be said, with reference to the well, to be any flow of water at all.
In the case, therefore, of the well, there can be no ground for implying any
mutual consent or agreement, for ages past, between the owners of the
several lands beneath which the underground springs may exist, which is
one of the foundations on which the law as torunningstreams is supposed
to be built ; nor for the same reason, can any trace of a positive law be in-
ferred from long continued acquiescence and submission, whilst the very
existence of the underground springs or of the well may be unknown to
the proprietors of the soil.
But the difference between the two cases, with respect to the conse-
quences, if the same law is to be applied to both, is still more apparent.
In the case of the running stream, the owner of the soil merely transmits
the water over its surface ; he receives as much from his higher neighbor
as he sends down to his neighbor below; he is neither better nor worse ; the
level of the water remains the same. But if the man who sinks the well
in his own land. can acquire by that act an absolute and indefeasible right
to the water that collects in it, he has the power of preventing his neigh-
bor from making apy use of the springs on his own soil which shall inter-
fere with the enjoyment of the well. He has the power, still further, of
debarring the owner of the land in whichthe springisfirstfound, or through
which it is transmitted, from draining his land for the proper cultivation
of the soil; and thus, by an act which is voluntary on his part, and which
may be entirely unsuspected by his neighbor, he may impose on such
neighbor the necessity of bearing a heavy expense, if the latter have
erected machinery for the purposes of mining, and discovers, when too
late, that the appropriation of water has already been made. Further,
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the advantage on one side and the detriment to the other, may bear no
proportion. The well may be sunk to supply a cottage, or a drinking
place for cattle, whilst the owner ofthe adjoining land may be prevented
from winning metals and minerals of inestimable value. Andlastly, there
is no limit of space within which the claim of right to an underground
spring can be confined; in the present case, the nearest coal pit is at,the
distzrce of half a mile from the well; it is obvious this law must equally
apply if there is an interval of many miles. Considering, therefore, the
state of circumstances upon which the law is founded in the one case to
be entirely dissimilar from those which exist in the other, and that the
application of the same rule to both would lead in many cases, to conse-
quences at once unreasonable and unjust, we feel ourselves warranted in
holding upon principle, that the case now under discussion does not fall
within the rule which obtains as to surface streams, nor is it to be governed
by analogy therewith.
The Court expressly abstained from expressing what
would have been its opinion, had the well been an ancient
one.
We have quoted very fully from Sir NICHOLAS TIN-
DAL'S opinion, and present it to the reader as a masterly
statement of the reasons of the difference between the law
applicable to surface and that applicable to underground
waters. It will be observed that while the Court did not
make any deliverance upon the question of the right to an
ancient well, yet the argument of the Chief Justice tends
very strongly to negative any acquirement of a right by pre-
scription under ordinary circumstances, unless the doctrine
applicable in England to ancient lights can be applied to
an ancient well. But there is a marked difference in the
two cases; in the case of the window, the neighboring land-
owner knows it is overlooking him, and that it depends for
its use on his own inaction; in the case of the well, no matter
how ancient, he ordinarily does not know, until he has made
experiments by digging on his own soil, whether the well is
supplied from that soil or not.
The next case of importance in England is Dicnson et a.
v. The Grand function Canal Co. (1852), 7 Exch. 282, in
which a case was sent by the Master of the Rolls to the
Exchequer for an opinion, inter alia, upon the question
whether the diversion of subterranean water (which would
Vor,. XXX-16
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otherwise have percolated to a stream used for, the purpose
of driving the plaintifPs mill, which diversion was caused
by the digging of a well upon the defendants' land), was
such an injury to the plaintiff that he could maintain an
action therefor at common law. The Court held the action
maintainable, saying:
As to the abstraction of the water which never did form part of the
rivers, but has been prevented from doing so in its natural course, by the
excavation of the well, whether the water was part of an underground
water course or percolated through the strata, we are also of opinion that
an action would lie. The mill owners were entitled to the benefit of the
stream in its natural course; and they are deprived of part of that benefit
if the natural supply of the stream is taken away.
Acton v. Blundell was noticed by POLLOCK, C. B., in the
course of his opinion, and sustained on the ground that in
such a case, i. e., the ruin of a well by mining operations,
"the existence and state of underground water is generally
unknown before the well is made, and after it is made, there
is a difficulty in knowing certainly how much, if any, indeed,
of the water of the well, when the ground was in its natural
state, belonged to the owner in right of his property in
the soil, and how much belonged to that of his neighbor
who, in digging a moat or another well, may, possibly, be
only taking back his own." The effect of Dickinson v. The
Canal Co., therefore, if it be law, is to make the general
rule, aqua currit, et debel currere, ut solebat currere, appli-
cable to subterranean waters, and to refuse its enforcement
in cases of uncertainty; in other words, simply to establish
the rule, subject to the condition of the burden of proof of
showing that the case falls within it. The case did not,
however, long go unquestioned. It having been cited before
the Exchequer in Broadbent v. Ramsbotham (1856), II Ex.
602, PARKE, 'B., interrupted counsel with the remark:
That case only decided that if a person has a right to a stream jure
naturiz, he has a right to its subterranean course.
In 1857, the case of Chasenore v. Richards, 2 H. & N.
168, came, on error to the Exchequer, into the Exchequer
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Chamber. The facts were as follows: The plaintiff was the
owner of a mill, which for more than sixty years had been
driven by the river Wandle. The river was largely fed by
rain water which fell upon the district of Croydon and per-
colated to the river; in 185X, the Local Board of Health of
Croydon sunk a large well some quarter of a mile from the
river, and pumped water from said well for the supply of the
town, at the rate of between, 5oo0,00 and 6ooooo gallons a
day. Part of this water would naturally have flowed into the
Wandle above the plaintiffs mill, and the abstraction was of
a sufficient quantity of water to sensibly affect the working
of the mill. It was held by the majority of the Court,
WIGTMAN, CREssWELL, EARLE, WinLuAms,, CROMPTON and
CROWDER, JJ., that there could be no recovery, and-Dz kiz-
son v. Thm Grand Jundion Canal Co., having been premed
upon the Court, CRESSWELL, J., in the course of the opinion
of the Court, after quoting the portion of the opinion of PoL-
LOCK, L. C. B., as above, said:
The subject is dismissed with the simple assertion of the right, and we
are not in possession of the reasoning by which the Court arrived at that
conclusion. Another point decided in that case, viz.: that the company
by sinking a well had broken their agreement, rendered the rights of the
parties at common law immaterial to the decisiofi of the case, and which
may account for the dismissalof this novel pointwithso little observation,
The learned Judge likewise quoted Baron PARKE'S remark
in Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, supzra, and regarded the Dick,-
inson case, if it went beyond the limits assigned by the
Baron, as repudiated by the court by which it had been de-
cided. CoLERImGE, J., dissented from the opinion of the
court.
From the Exchequer Chamber the case was removed to
the House of Lords (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 349, where it was
very freely argued by very eminent counsel, amongst others
by Bovill', afterwards Lord Chief Justice of the Common
Pleas, before whom the first Tichborne case was tried, and
Sir Fitz Roy Ke113, the last of the Chief Barons, and, aftir
the opinion of the judges had been asked by the House, the
judgment of the Exchequer Chamber was affirmed. Lord
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CEELMSORD, L. C., regarded the case as ruled by Adon v.
Blundell, supra, and referring to the strictures upon Dickin-
son v. The GrandJundion Canal Co. by CR Isswmiai J., rid
by WIGHTMAN, J., in delivering the opinion of the Judges
to* the House, expressed his entire concurrence with the
Judges, and declared that the Dickinson case could hardly be
regarded as a satisfactory decision upon the point under con-
sideration. With Lord CHELMSropm, Lords CRAwWORH,
KINGSDOWN and BROUiGHAM concurred, and Lord WENS-
L YDALB, who, as r. Baron PAexp, had criticized and lim-
ited the decision in Dickinson v. The Grand Junction Canal
Co., did not advise a reviewal, but hesitated as to affirmance,
because the water taken by the Croydon Board of Health was
not for use on the land from which it was taken, but for the
supply of the town.
This decision of the highest English court may be re-
garded as overruling Dckinson v. The GrandJundion Canal
Co., and as having settled the law to be as above stated.
This view is supported by Queen v. Metrololitan Board of
Works (1863), 3 B. & S. 710; GrandJunclion Canal Co.
v. Shugar (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. App. 483, and see also
Brain v. Mfarfell (1879), 28 Weekly Reporter 130, S. C. 20
AMERIcAN LAW REGISTER 93, where the Court of Appeal
(COL6urxIDG, L. C. J., BRAMWELL and BRMV, L. JJ.) treated
the law as absolutely settled, and counsel did not attempt to
rely upon the Dickinson case, but endeavored to distinguish
the case in hand from Chasemore v. Richards. The estab-
lished rule was in Poblewell v. Hodkinson (1869), L. R. 4
Exch. 248, applied under rather. peculiar circumstances,
namely, where the draining of land not only cut off the
water supply of the adjoining property, but deprived it of
the support it had theretofore enjoyed from subterranean
water, thereby causing the land itself to subside
The same conclusion which has been arrived at in
England, after considerable discussion and not without some
hesitation, was reached in the United States at an earlier date.
In Greenleaf v. Francis (1836), 18 Pick. (Mass.) 117, the
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plaintiff had a well in his cellar; the defendant dug a well
upon his own soil -and, after that time, the -water did not
flow so, copiously as -formerly into the- plainitifP s Well. It
was held he-re 6iild b n-o recovery. T'he questionddies not
EeMto have aisen again xte United States until the case
of Roatk v. Priscoll (&5o), -2o Conn. 533, where it-was de-
cided the -same-'-a-y, Aoi v CUndell and' Gr~eieaf v.
Frnczsb~in c i H ". 855, was decided Wkealeyv. 
Iaugh,
25 Pa. 528, -which, on :account of the frequency with
which it- has been cited, afid the dear and admirabI6 opinion
of Liws, C. .,may e regarded as the leading American
case on subterranean waters. That case decided in positive
s thatno right-exi ted imthe 9wner-of one-piece of land
t,9 ,eceive Percolations-Through tlie land -of another, and that
such a right could n acquired by prescription. In-the
coure of the opinion the learnedChief Justice said :.
:Percolatiof'spfeuldin every diretion- throiigfili&eearth, and itis im-
possible-to avoid_-dsrbing them without relinquishing the -necessary en-
joymnent of the land. .Accordingly the law has.never gone so .lras to
reeognize in one man a iightto convert another's farm to his own use, for
thfi'pur of =fillter,- Suc" claim,- if sustained, would amount to a
total abrogation of-the right bf property. * * - Even if this right'
were admitted to exist, the difficulty in ascertaining the fact-of its violation,
,s well as the extent of it, wouldbe insurmountable. * * But it seems
to be thoughttiht the dnjoyment of the' spring by the plaintiff below and
thos under whoni le claims; Tor the 1eriod of twenty-one years, gives
him a right to its continuedexistence, although the -neighboring proprie-
tor may thereby be deprived of the chief value of his own land. This de-
pends upon the question whether the enjoyment of the spring was such
asto have invaded his neighbior's rights so as to enable thie latter to main-
tain an action for the injury. No man can be barred by a statute oflimi-
tation for not bringing his action within the prescribed period, until it is
first shown that he had a cause'of actiont whichhe cpuld have maintained.
I.ai.alogy-to t1ie statnteaJompresumiption ban arise against a party-on the
ground of long j!o!ymt Sfa privilege by another, until it is shown that
the privilege, in some measure, interfered with the rights of the party
ihose grdti proposed to bepresumed, aid that lie had a legal right to
prevent such. enjbyinenf- by pioceedings at law.: -'  * The bwner of
the mine hdg, 4I4ghtt otoUplain ofhis 4eighbor beow for -making-use
of the spring on his own lands., As long as it flowed there, he:had" the
right to 'rie ie of it, and the ownr of the land through which the
sujppl fwater care,-wad ndt ih'aiin -iifarinfured by 5 such-se offhe
water. -Silenp- :or acquiescence,. where one is not injured and has no
cause of co "is u neyerAeprivehin of hisrights on the gruid of
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presumption of a grant. No man can be said to have granted a right
about which it would have been an impertinent interference to utter a
complaint: Hoy v. Slerrit (1834), 2 Watts (Pa.) 331; Merlin's Repertoire
de Jurisp. verb. "Cours d'Fau." Besides, it was impossible for him to
know from ,whence the supply of water came. He ]iad no knowledge
that it was derived from percolations through his own land. In this re-
spect there is a material difference between hidden veins of water under
the ground and water courses flowing on the surface. The latter are ap-
parent and, if appropriated in such a way as to injure the rights of the
owner through whose land they flow, he can takecognizance of the wrong
and is bound to redress it by action within the period prescribed by law.
But the former is not apparent, and the owner of the land is not bound to
resort to an action to redress a wrong of which he cannot by any possi-
bility have notice.
As supporting the same general view of the law, see Ellis
v. Duncan (i855), 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 230; Czafield v. Wilsoiz
(I856), 28 Vt. 49; S. C 5 AmmE CAN LAW RZG.mi i
(0. S.) 528; New Albany RR. Co., v. Peterson (I86o),
14 Ind. 112; Frazier v. Brown (1861), 12 Ohio St 294;
Trustees of Delhi v. Youmans (1867), 50 Barb. (N. Y.).316,
affirmed (187), 45 N. Y. 362; Swett v. Cuts (1870),
5oN. H. 439; S. C- ii AM P iCA LAw RmISTFR. II;
Zkosier v. Caldwell (1872), 7 Nev. 363; Chase v. S-
verstone (1873), 62 Me. 175; Taylor v. Fickas (1874),
64 Ind. 167; S. c I8 A=RICAN LAW R-EGISTM 249;
Coleman v. Chadwick (I875), 80 Pa. 8I ; Chesey v. King
(1882), 74 Me. 164; Ocean Grove Camfi Meeting Assod-
alion v. Commissioners of Asbury Park (1885), 40 N. J. Eq.
447; Bloodgood v. Ayres (I885), 37 N. Y. S. C. 356, af-
firmed (I888), io8 N. Y. 4oo.
4. Reasons given for foregoing rule.
The reason assigned for the exemption of percolating
water (and under this title we include water flowing in an
unknown course), from the rules governing water courses, is_
generally based on the ground that water percolating is a
part of the soil, or, at least, cannot be distinguished from it,
so that if correlative rights as to a flow of percolating water
were recognized between adjacent or neighboring owners,
"the land-owner would be deprived of that absolute
dominion over his soil which is his by the common law."
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This position is supported by the opinion of TINDAL, C. J.,
in Acton v. Blundell, subra. In Buffiem v. Harris (1858),
5 R. L 243, it is said by AMES, C. J., in delivering the
opinion of the Court:
Water, whether it has fallen as rain or has come from the overflow of a
pond or swamp, which sinks into the top soil, and struggles through it,
following no defined channel, is deemed by the law absolutely to belong to
the owner of the land upon. which it is found, for the avowed purpose of
enabling him to cultivate his land by controlling or drsining it off in the
mode most convenient to him, and is not affected by any right in the
owner of an adjoining river, pond or tank which it may chance for the
time to feed, though that time be ever so long protracted. It is not water
in a water course, or in an infinitesimal number of minute water courses, in
the sense of being obedient to the law regulating the use of water flowing
in such defined natural channels; but is in the eye of the law, as well as
of common sense, the moisture and a part of the soil with which it in-
termingles, to toe there used by the owner of the soil, if to his advantage,
or to be got rid of in any mode he pleases, if to his detriment.
See also Mosier v. Caldwell, Trustees of DelMi v. You-
maus, Chatfield v. Wilson, supra. This position is, however,
strenuously attacked in Bassett v. Salisbury Afanujaduring
Co. (1862), 43 N. H. 569; S. C. 3 AMB.RICAN LAW RiGISTnR
223, in which case it is said by BARTLETT, J.:
Nordo we think that the maxim cited [cujusest solum, dusesi adcoeurn
et ad inferos] can be applied to establish an unqualified ownership of
water in all cases any more properly than it can be relied upon to prove
an absolute property in all the air within one'sbounds. If theland owner
has the absolute and unqualified ownership of all such water in or upon
his land, his neighbor, by digging or otherwise, has no more right to take
away his property water than his property sand. * * * If the water,
not gathered into natural water courses, belongs absolutely to the owner
of the land, because it is part of the soil, and for that reason only, it must
be subject to the same law as the other components of the soil * * *
which may not ordinarily be removed by an adjacent owner by the with-
drawal of their natural, support. * * * But such a doctrine would
lead to exactly the same mischiefs that have caused the rejection of the
one first discussed. It would prevent all improvement or beneficial en-
joyment of the land in precisely the same way.
Much of what is said by the learned Judge in the course
of his opinion is, strictly speaking, obiter dida, the case
having been an action for obstructing the course of natura*
drainage by a dam; the doctrine of the case, however, goes
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to the full extent above stated, and confines the right of a
land-owner in dealing with subterranean percolating water,
to a reasonable use. The Judge frankly admits that the
views adopted in this case by his Court are in conflict with
the weight of authority outside of New Hampshire. Inside
of that State, however, the doctrine has been recognized in-
Swelt v. Culls (187O), 50 N. H. 439, and perhaps the con-
flict between the two lines of authority may be reconciled by
regarding the land-owner as vested with the absolute power
of appropriation or disposition over the percolating subter-
ranean water, provided he exercise the power while the water
is upon his land. This, which would assimilate the -water to
a beast fer- natur&, would, of course, not limit the land-
owner's right to a reasonable use; that is, if "reasonable"
is to carry with it the idea of restriction, but it would get
rid of the paradox suggested as arising from the theory
which justifies the land-owner's dominion Dn the ground
that the water is part of the soil. [See also i i AmERICAN
LAW REGISTER II.
S. Application of rule to supier and sub-jacent lands.
An interesting application of the principle that the land
owner has the right to intercept percolations is found in
Ballacorkhi Silver, Lead and Copper Mining Co. v. Ziarri-
son (1873), L. R. 5 P C. 49, when'the question was between
super and sub-jacent proprietors. In that case, a grant had
been made by the Earl of Derby to the plaintifPs predeces-
sors in the title of certain land in the Isle of Man, reserving
mines and minerals. The right of the lord of the isle be-
came, afterwards, vested in the Crown, which subsequently
denied to the defendant (appellant)'company the mines un-
der the land of the plaintiff; in the course of the mining
operations, the waters which otherwise would have risen to
the surface were cut off Counsel for the plaintiff endeavored
to establish a distinction between cases involving adjoining
lateral proprietors and the case before the Court, and also ar-
gued that the lord of the manor could not derogate from his
own grant; but Lord PZNZANCE said:
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The reasoning, whatever weight attaches to it, appears to apply to the
present case; but the respondent's argument admits of a more cogent
answer. The Court in both the cases cited [Adon v. Blundell, Chase-
more v. Richards] dwelt upon the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility
of pursuing the courses of this natural percolation of water, so as to bring
together cause and result, with that reasonable degree of certainty which
ought to attend the enforcement of a legal right, and relied upon this
difficulty as a prominent reason for declaring damage of this description
to be damnum absgue iojuria. * * If, then, the lord is thus possessed
of the mines as of his own original title in the soil, he has all the rights
incidental to that ownership, and among others hehas the rightto the use of
all waters found thereon and percolating by natural processes into the mines
whenopened. * * Andthequestioniswhetherinexercisinga rightthus-
incident to the ownership reserved to him, he isderogating from anything
which he has expressly, or by iiecessary implication, granted to the tenants
of the manor. Express grant of these springs for the use of the tenant, of
course, there is none. * * Ifsuch a grantcould be implied at all, there-
fore, it could only be so as part of the general ownership and dominion
of the surface which carries with it, no doubt, the right to the use of the
water falling upon it, or rising in the form of aspring, orat anytime found
upon it. But the same thing is true, as has been just pointed out of the
ownership of the mines. How then are these respective rights to be
reconciled ? They cannot in a legal point of view, be distinguished from
those of the owners of adjacent portions of the same dose, the only differ-
ence being that the former are adjacent vertically instead of laterally.
* * In what respect then do their, rights differ from those of the owners
of adjoining closes, who are strangers in title, each of whom is entitled by
law to the water found upon his land, but neither of whom is entitled to
complain of the loss of that water by natural percolation set in action by
his neighbor's excavations.
It appears to their Lordships that the two cases are substantially iden-
tical, and that the same law must govern both. The grant of the surface
cannot carry with it more than the absolute ownership of the entire soil
would include. The absolute ownership is held not to include a right to
be protected from loss of water by percolation into openings made in the
soil of a neighboring owner. How, then, can the grant of the surface
only be held to include such a protection ?
6. Right to intercePIt percolation confined to lid-owner.
The right to intercept percolating waters is strictly con-
fined to the owner of land; if, therefore, one exercisinga
special right in land, e. g., a municipality in the construc-
tion of a sewer, so construct works or disturb the soil upon
which it has lawfully entered, that the well of an adjoining
land-owner is rendered dry by interference with the natural
percolation, the person or body exercising the right is re-
sponsible in damages: Trowbridge v. Brookline (1887), 144
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Mass. 139, and see Parker v. Boston and Maine RR. (1849),
3 Cush. (Mass.) io7.
The case of Ilougan v. The Afilwaukee and St Paul RR.
Co. (1872), 35 Iowa 558, at first sight seems to conflict with
this rule, but an examination of the opinion as applied to
the facts, shows that the Court had no intention of departing
from the law as generally understood. In that case, the de-
fendant held by a deed which conveyed to it "for all pur-
poses connected with the construction, use and occupation
of said railway, the right of way over and through" certain
land of the plaintiff. The company, for the purpose of sup-
plying its engines with water, dug a well within the limits
of its right of way, with the effect of materially diminish-
ing the supply of water to a spring on the plaintifPs land.
It was contended that as the defendant was not owner of
the land, it was liable for the diversion of the percolation.
The Court said, by COLE, J.:
But the defendant in this case is not the absolute and unqualified owner,
or owner in fee of the land whereon the well was dug. The defendant,
however, is owner by grant from the plaintiff of ' the right of 'vay over
and through the landfor all purposes connected zith the construction, use
and occuiation of its railway." We have not been referred to, nor have
we been able to find, any case deciding this question. Upon principle, it
is very close; and yet we find ourselves agreed in holding with the
learned judge who decided the cause below, that under the terms of the
conveyance and the facts of the case the defendant had the legal right to
dig the well, and cannot be enjoined from using the water therefrom for
railway purposes. * * The cause of action arises from the wrongfld
act of diggibg the well, andnot from the consequenceswhichflow from it.
For if the right to dig the well exists, these latter are damnum absque in-
juria. Now that the digging of wells to supply water to its engines is
one'of the "purposes connected with the use of a railway," can scarcely
admit of a doubt. The right to locate a water tank upon its right of way
cannot be more clear than the right to dig a well to supply it; both are
equally necessary to operate the road, and are fairly embraced in the
phrase "all purposes connected with the construction, use and occupation
of the railway."
Whatever may be thought of the soundness of the decision,
it is clear that it does not in any way attack the rule above
stated, but is referable to the class of cases in which the
rights of adjoining owners are restricted by contract; for
which see infra.
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7. Afalicious interference witk Percolations.
In some books and opinions, it is said that where the land
owner, in cutting off percolations from his neighbor, acts
malzmsly, he may be held liable for the damage thereby
done to his neighbor. This position has been vigorously at-
tacked, and the weight of authority and reason seems, so far
as the common law is concerned, to be against it. It is the
rule of the civil law, as appears by the following citation
from the. Digest, Lib. 39, Tit 3, § 12:
Denique Marcellus scribit, cum eo qui in suo fodiens vicini fontem
avertit, nihil posse agi, nee de dolo. Et sane actionem non debet habere,
Si nn animo vicino nocendi, sed suum agrum meliorem faciendi id fecit
There are several dicta which seem to recognize this rule
as existing at the common law, but we are unable to find any
decided case in which malice.has been made a ground of re-
covery. In Greenleaf v. Francis (1836), 18 Pick. (Mass.)
117, PUTNAM, J., after speaking of the right of the land
owner with referenc e to percolations, said "These rights
should not be exercised from mere malice" ; but whether he
laid down a rule of law or simply stated what all must admit,
in the abstract, to be a sound position in morals is both
doubtful and immaterial, for the question of malice was
not involved in the case. A dictum of LEwis, C. J., in
TWeatley v. Baugh (1855), 25 Pa. 528, also recognizes a
liability in case of malice. In Haldeman v. Bruckhardt
(1863), 45 Pa. 514, STRONG, J., after quoting the passage
from the Digest above cited, apparently regards the civil law
rule as incorporated in the common law, but goes on to say
that there was no evidence of malice or of negligence
on the part of the defendant in the case before him, and
it does not seem to have been contended in the Court below
that any malice existed. BOARDMAN, J., in the Trustees of
Delhiv. Youmans (1867), 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 316, recognized
the existence of malice as causing an exception to the rule
of the non-accountability of the land owner, but in that case
no malice was alleged; and in Chesley v. King (1882), 74
Me., 164, after a careful consideration, in which the cases of
THE LAW OF SUBTERRNEA WATERS.
Chatfield v. Widsn and Phelfs v. Nowkn, infra, were before
the Court, the exception was upheld, although the facts of the
case were not regarded as bringing it within the exception.
This is the nearest to a direct authority that we have been
able to find in favor of the exception, and it, too, must be
relegated to the class of dic-a. See also Brown v. lius
(1858), 27 Conn. 84; Redman v. Forman (1885), 83 Ky.
214. The ditum of BRINcEERHOF, J., in Frazier v. Brown
(i86i), 12 Ohio St 294, seems to standby itself; it is as fol-
lows: "Subject only to the possible exception of a case of
unmixed malice, the maxim, Icujus est sohn, ejus est usque
ad coelum et ad inferos,' applies to its full extent"
On %the other hand, the existence of the exception has
been strenuously denied. In ChatFied v. Wilson (1855), 28
Vt 49, BENNnT, J., in delivering the opinion of the Court,
insisted that there were no correlative rights amongst land-
owners, arising out of subterranean percolating waters such
as existed with regard to surface streams, and that an act
violating no right could not be made actionable on account
of the motive which induced it. In Phel6s v. Nowleki
(1878), 72 N. Y. 39, we have a direct decision upon the
question. In that case, the Court below found:
That when the defendant dug his ditch, he supposed that the water
in the plaintiff's well communicated in some hidden and undefined way
with the water in his spring; that he expected the lowering of the spring
would be followed by a diversion of subsurface water from the well and a
consequent depression of the surface of the water in the well; that he in-
tended to produce that result; that he dug the ditch for that purpose and
no other, and that in so far as such intent and purpose, under the cir-
cumstances above found, can constitute malice, his motive was malicious.
In the Court above, the defendant had judgment, and
MILLER, J., in delivering the opinion, after admitting that
the defendant had acted maliciously, said (citing the earlier
New York cases):
These cases tend to establish the doctrine in this State, that -if a
man has a legal right, courts will not inquire into the motive by which
he is actuated in enforcing the same. A different rule would lead
to the encouragement of litigation and prevent, in many instances, a
complete and full enjoyment of the right of property which inheres to
the owner of the soil.
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The learned Judge also characterized the doctrine an-
nounced in Trustees of Delhi v. Youmans (1867), 50 Barb
(N. Y.) 316, 320, as obier, and as not sustained by the
authorities cited.
Lord WENSLEYDALE also, in Chasemore v. Richards
(1859), 7 H. of L., cases 349, 387, after stating that the civil
law deemed an act, otherwise lawful, illegal if done animo
vicini nocendi, and that the law of Scotland was the same,
added, "but this principle has not found a place in our law."
This testimony to the law is all the more important, because
all through his opinion the noble and learned Lord showed a
tendency to limit the exercise of the right 6f the land-owner,
more strictly than in the judgment of the other law lords
who delivered opinions, it should be limited.
8. Contractual regulation of rights in subterranean waters.
Of course, it is always in the power of land owners to es-
tablish between themselves correlative rights and obligations
with reference to percolating waters, as in any case a man
may by contract acquire a righi in his neighbor's land or
limit the exercise of his own upon his own soil, and, there-
fore, where there is a covenant between the parties, or a grant
existing, with reference to the use by one land owner of his
land so far as concerns subterranean water, he cannot, when
he has intercepted percolating water, rely upon his common
law right to do so without being accountable to his neighbor
for injury worked to him thereby, but his liability or non-
liability will be determined by the proper construction of
the covenant or grant and for acts done in violation or dero-
gation thereof the land owner will be responsible: Whze-
head v. Parks (1858), 2 H. & N. 870; Johnstown Cheese
Manufacturing Co. v. Veghte (1877), 69 N. Y. 16; Cham-
berlain v. Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co. (1887), 66 Md. 518.
But to limit the common law right of the land owner, the
grant or contract must be express. A limitation cannot be
inferred from a mere grant of land, on the principle that a
grantor cannot derogate from his grant; see Ballacorkish
Silver, Lead& Copper Mfining Co. v. Harrison (1873), L. R.
5 P. C. 49, sufira; or from the mere grant of a spring; thus
THV, LAW OF SUBTERRANEAN WATERS.
inBlisv. Greeley(I87I), 45 N. Y. 671, a grant was made to the
plaintiff by the defendant's predecessor in title of "the right
and use, to dig, stone up or box up a certain spring of water
situated on the land of the said H." It was held that this
grant did not prevent the defendant from digging a well on
another part of the premises, the effect of which was to ren-
der the plaintifi's well useless. PECKHAM, J., in delivering
the opinion of the Court, said :
Whitehead v. Parks is an instructive case, but I do not think it con-
trols this. The grant there was much broader than here. * * The grant
here is limited and specific. It grants the right io dig and box up a
spring and to insert a pipe therein and conduct it over the grantor's land.
This did not make a servient estate of the grantor's whole farm. It is
difficult to see how the plaintiff acquired more thereby than if he had ob-
tained a grant in fee of the land including the spring and the track of the
pipe. Under a grant in fee, it is quite clear that he could have no relief
against the acts found in this 6ase. * * * This grant prevents the
grantor and his assigns from any substantial interference -with the spring
or the pipe. It does not prevent their impiovement or use of the residue
of the farm. Had the parties designed to make the whole farm servient
to this easement, they should have expressed that purpose. In the ab-
sence of such expression the grantor is permitted to use the residue of
his farm, as any proprietor may his laud.
9. Land-owner not resf5onsible for Percolation of fiure
water, unless le have accumulated it by artifzcidl means.
From the right of the owner of land to deal as he pleases
with his own soil, irrespective of the effect his action may
have upon the percolating water, it follows that, unless he
act negligently, he is not responsible for damage done by
the percolation of pure water to the land of another: Smith
v. Kenrick (1849), 7 Man. Gran. & S. 515. If, however,
he accumulate water upon his premises, and by reason of
the increased pressure on the soil, water is driven through it
to the injury -of the neighbor's property, he is responsible
therefor. This is the principle of the well-known case,
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L. R. 3 H. of L. 330, and is sup-
ported by Monson 6& Brimfeld Aanufaturing Co. v. Fuller
(1834), I5 Pick. (Mass.) 554 ; Fuller v. Chicopee Afanufac-
turing Co. (I86o), 16 Gray (Mass.) 46; Pixey v. Clark
(1866), 35 N. Y. 520; Wilson v. Newze Bedford (1871), 1O8
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Mass. 261; Snow v. White/ad (1884), L. R. 27 Ch. D. 588;
S. C. 24 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 230; Parker v. Larsen,
decided by the Supreme Court of California, October 30,
189o. It is referable, rather, to the head of negligence, or
of tort in endeavoring to impose upon the adjoining prop-
erty a burden of lateral support in excess of that imposed
upon it by law (which is at most simply that of supporting
its adjoiner in its natural state), than to the law of waters,
properly speaking.
io. Pollution of Percolating W/aters.
The next question which arises is the liability of the
owner of land if he pollute the percolations which flow
through his land, so that the water which reaches his neigh-
bor through the earth is ruined or rendered useless to him
for the purposes for which it is required; and this question
must be considered independently of, and must be kept distinct
from, two classes of cases; the first, where a liability arises
from the negligent doing of a lawful act upon the defendant's
premises, as in W~oodward v. Aborn (1853), 35 Me. 271,
where the defendant had placed a heap of manure on his
premises near to the plaintiff's well and, having been notified
to remove it, allowed it to remain for two days, after which
time came on a heavy rain, which soaked through the
manure and ran into the plaintiffs well; and see Stainton v.
Wool ycz (i856), 23 Beav. 225 ; the second, where the in-
jury to the plaintiff's water is done by the percolation of oil,
gas or other offensive matters themselves, as in Pottstoz
Gas Co. v. Afiirhy (186I), 39 Pa. 257; Columbus Gas
Liht Co. v. Freeland (1861), 12 Ohio St. 392 ; Ottawa Gas
Light Co. v. Graham (1862), 28 Ill. 73, s. C 38 Id. 346,
which class of cases rzsts upon the doctrine of nuisance pure
and simple, and upon the rule of law that no one has the
right to cast upon the premises of another a noxious
material.
The question of liability for fouling percolating waters is
one upon which the authorities have differed. On the one
side, it is said that the law will permit a land-owner to cut
off or to entirely destroy his neighbor's water supply, so far
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as it depends upon percolation, and if he may so destroy it,
it would be inconsistent to say he may not destroy it by ren-
dering it useless through the deterioration of its quality.
On the other hand, it is said that while the law contemplates
the possibility of the exhaustion of subterranean water in
the course of operations by a land-owner on his own prem-
ises, and also does not hold him to a knowledge of subter-
ranean courses, yet it does not recognize his right to foul
and communicate to his neighbor that which he does -not
use; and further, that he cannot well foul even subterranean
water without knowing that he does so.
In this country, the decisions are conflicting. The earliest
reported case on this subject seems to be Brown v. Zilius,
which was twice before the Supreme Court of Connecticut,
the last time in 1858, reported in 27 Conn 84- In that
ca e, the defendant placed on his lot coal tar, gas lime and
other offensive materials, which soaked into the ground 'and
thus fouled subterranean waters by which the plaintiff's well
was supplied. It was held that, so far as the damage com-
plained of arose from this cause, the plaintiff had no cause
of action, STORRS, C. J., saying:
We would also express our concurrence with the judge below in that
part of his charge in which he instructed the jury that if, in this case, the
water falling upon the noxious substances on the plaintiff's land, sunk
into the ground and carried with it those substances and became com-
mingled with subterraneous streams or currents, and they were by such
streams or currents alone transmitted to the plaintiff's well and it was
corrupted in this mode, there would be no violation by the defendant of
the legal rights of the plaintiff, and therefore the latter, for any damage
so occasioned, could not recover.
The next case is Clark v. Lawrence (186o), 6 Jones Eq.
N. C. 83, where the Court held that'if a cemetery were so
located as by its use to injure the water of a neighboring well,
the burial of the dead in the cemeteryshouldbe enjoined, and
directed an issue to determine "whether the burial of the
dead in the church lot mentioned in the pleadings, has pro-
duced, or, if continued, is likely to produce sickness in the
plaintifPs family, or to impair their comfort, either by cor-
rupting the air or the water in his wells." This case is
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diametrically -opposed to .Geeencastle v. Z2azedtI (1864),' 23
Ind. _86, wherein it was held thAt the_ruining, of a spring
through the discharge- into it of subterranean ,streamg- and
percolations fouled by passage through, a cenetdry -was
damnum absque injuria. In Ball v. Nye (1868), 99 Mass.
582, a defendailt-was held liable for injuak'done by tie !10ng
.continued per clation of foul. water from isprf i s to..a
neighbor's well, and the Court did not- expressly place the
-responsibility of the defendant'on the ground 6f negligence,
'other than such negligence as could be inferred from a fail-
ure to prevent the communication of filth-to the neighboring
premises. CoOny- J.;- in UAjohzz v. Rka-id Tonsh/
'(r881), 46 Mich ,542, comments upon Ball v. Aye,,and Upon
Jfodgkinsony. E nnor, infra, and points out that in both of
these cases, consistently with the- proper use of the defend-
ant's premises the exclusion -of the'foul 'matter from 'he
water was practicable.
In'Dilonv. Acme Oil Co. (1888) 56 N; Y. S. C. 565,
it was held in the 'absence-of evidince of negligeice, thit
where oil percolated thr6ugh the ea- fr6m the dfe ndants
refinery until it struck water by which it was conveyed to
the plaintif's well, no .ction would lie. HAiGHT, J., in his
opinion, distinguished the case from Womersley v. Church
(Rolls, 1867)i i7 Law Times Rep. (N.-S.) 19o, and Nortolv.
Scholefield (1842), 9 M. & W. 665, on- th& -ground- that in
those cases the evidence showed that the filth itself had per-
colated- to the water of the plaintiff '
An interesting case upon this :subject is- Colliit v. Char-
tiers Valley Gas-Co. -(189o), 131 Pa. 143. 'Ii tt -c-"'in
boring for natural gas, the defendant drove its well'th ough
a vein of fresh water-some seventy feet from the surfa' cwhich
supplied the plaintiffs'well, and at about seven iundred
feet it passed through a large quantity of sal water, which,
rising and mingling with the fresh water, ruined the plain-
tiff's wel1 evidence was given that the defendant ought to
have anticipated that its well would encounter the salt water.
In the court below, judgment was iven-for thedefendant and
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Hodgkinson v. Ennor, which -was cited to the Court, was re-
garded as against the weight of authority. On appeal, the
decision was reversed. In the coulse of his opinion,
MITcmiLL, J., said:
Later cases, following Wheatley v. Baugh, h1ve held that injury to
springs, wells, etc., supplied by mere percolation, was not actionable, and
the reason has always been the same, that the damage could not be'fore-
seen or avoided, If the boundaries of knowledge have been so enlarged
as to make an end of the reason, then cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex.
Geology is a progressive, and now in many respects a practical science;
and as truly remarked by the learned judge below, in his opinion on the
motion for a new trial, "since the decisions inActon v. Blundell and
Wheatley v. Baugh, probably more deep wells have been drilled in
Western Pennsylvania than had previously been dug in the entire earth
'in all time. And that which was held to be necessarily unknown and
merely speculative as to the flow of water underground, has been, by ex-
perience in such cases as this, reduced almost to a certainty." If this is
the state of knowledge at the present day, if the existence of a stratun"
of clear water and its flow into wells and springs of the vicinity, and the
existence of a separate and deeper stratum of salt water, which is likely
to rise and mingle with the fresh when penetrated in boring for oil or gas,
are known, and the means of preventing the mixing are available at
reasonable expense, then, clearly, it would be a violation of the living
spirit of the law not to recognize the change and apply the settled and im-
mutable principles of right to the altered conditions of facts.
It is true the Court spoke of negligence in not guarding
against the mingling, but as the omission could only be
negligent if there were a danger of injuring (i. e., violating
the right of) another, the case may be placed within the
class of those which recognize the right of the receiver of
percolations to be protected from the fouling thereof, unless
such fouling is inevitable, while it may not go so far as to
insure him that right at all events. The case came again to
the Supreme Court in 1891, and the former decision was ad-
hered to, but the matter of negligence was made more promi-
nent, WILLWs, J., saying :
The ground of the defendant's liability isnegligence, thewant of reason-
able care, under the circumstances, for the rights of others.
It will be seen, therefore, that the American cases are in
state of conflict.
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In England, in Z-odgkinson v. Ennor (1863), 4 Best &
Sm. 229, a sharp distinction was taken between the diver-
sion of subterranean water and its pollution, by Lord CocK-
BURN and BLACKBURN and MELLOR, JJ., the Chief Justice
saying in effect that the water once having been fouled by
the defendant, it was unimportant by what route he went to
the water of the plaintiff, and MELLOR, J., saying:
There is a great distinction between the abstraction of water before iA
becomes the property of the plaintiff and sending polluted water into
water to which he is entitled.
In Ballard v. Tomlinson (1884), L. R. 26 Ch. Div. x94,
PEARSON, J., disregarded the distinction. In that case, plain-
tiff and defendant were adjoining land-owners; each had
upon his premises a well, that of~the plaintiff being at a
lower level than that of the defendant, the two wells having
a common source of supply in water which percolated under-
ground from the defendant's to the plaintiff's land. The de-
fendant by a drain turned filth into his well which tpolluted
the waterwhich percolated to and injured the plaintiff's well.
PEARSON, J., held that, as the plaintiff had no property in the
underground water which came from the defendant's land,
he had no cause of action against the defendant for polluting
such water, saying, "as the defendants were clearly entitled
to pump every drop of water out of their well and leave the
plaintifi with none, it would be no difference in principle if
they deprived him of the water by rendering it unfit for use."
This decision was criticized and differed from by Mr. Justice
KAY in the Chancery Division in Snowy. Whitehead (1884),
L. P. 27 Ch. Div. 588; S. C 24 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
23 o , and on the removal of Ballard v. Tomlinson to the
Court of Appeal, the Court, consisting of BRETT, M. R.,
COTTON and LINDrLrY, L. JJ., reversed the decision of Mr.
Justice PEARSON (1885), I. P. 29 Ch. D. 115. The Master
of the Rolls said:
Has any one of those who have an unlimited right of appropriation, a
right to contaminate that common reservoir or source as against those
who have an equal right with him to appropriate where he does not, or is
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he bound not to do anything which will prevent anybody to whom that
unlimited right of appropriation shall come to have such water'unaltered
in quality? * * It seems to me that although nobody has any property
in the common source, yet everybody has a right to appropriate it, and to
appropriate it in its natural state, and no one of those who have a right
to appropriate it has a right to contaminate that source so as to prevent
his neighborfrom having the full value of his right of appropriation. * *
I disagree with the decision of Mr. Justice PPlSoN, on the ground that
although nobody has any property in the percolating water, yet such
water is a common source which everybody has a right to appropriate,
and that, therefoie, no one is justified in injuring the right of appropri-
ation which everybody else has.
COTTON, L. J., after adverting to Chasemore v. Richzards,
said:
But here, what is it the defendants are doing? They are not using that
natural right; they are not taking the water, but they are putting upon
their land filth, which gets.down into the underground water in the
-water-bearing stratum, which is partly under their land and partly under
that of their neighbor. They are, therefore, in no way exercising that
right which a person who draws the water under his own land is exercis-
i4g.
And LINDLEY, L. J., said:
The right to foul water is not the same as the right to get it; and in my
opinion does not depend upon the same principles. Primafacie, every
mian has a right to get from his own land water which is naturally found
there, but it frequently happens that he cannot do this without diminish-
ing his neighbor's supply. In such a case, the neighbor must submit
to the inconvenience; but frima fade no man has a right to use his own
land in such a way as to be a nuisance to his neighbor, and whether the
-nuisance is effected by sending filth on to h-s neighbor's land, or by
putting poisonous matter on his own land and allowing it to escape on
his neighbor's land, or whether the nuisance is effected by poisoning the
air which his neighbor breathes, or the water which he drinks, appears to
me wholly immaterial.
II. Sublerranean streams with unknom or undefined
course, treated as Plercolations.
-Where the course of a subterranean stream is unknown or
not well defined, the law applicable to it is the same as that
applied to percolating waters. It is true that in Smith v.
Adams (1837), 6 Paige (N. Y.) 435, WALWORTH, Ch., ex-
pressed a contrary opinion, and would have sustained a bill
,to enjoin the diversion of an underground water course, on
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* the general principle that the owner of the superior heritage
has no right to divert the water which passes through his
land, to the injury of those who were accustomed to receive
it upon their lands below, had the amount of the injury
alleged been sufficient to bring the case within Chancery
jurisdiction in New York, but the only authority relied
upon by the learned Chancellor was Balstion v. Bensted
(i8o8), i Camp. 463, which is not now law, and the opinion,
which goes further than the facts of the case required,
seems to be now clearly opposed to the current of authority.
In Haldeman v. Bruckhardt (1863), 45 Pa. 514, STRONG, J.,
in delivering the opinibn of the Court, said:
A surface stream cannot be diverted without knowledge that the diver-
sion will affect a lower proprietor. Not so with an unknown subterrane-
ous percolation or stream. One can hardly have rights upon another's
land which are imperceptible, of which neither himself nor that other
can have any knowledge. No such right can be supposed to have been
taken into consideration when either the upper or lower tract was pur-
chased. The purchaser of lands on which there are unknown subsurface
currents, must buy in ignorance of any obstacle to the full enjoyment of
his purchase indefinitely downwards, and the purchaser of lands on which
a spring rises, ignorant where and how the water comes, caungot bargain
for any right to a secret flow of water in another's land. .' These
appear to us very sufficient reasons for distinguishing between surface
and subterranean streams, and denying to inferior proprietors any right
to control the flow of water in unknown.subterranean channels upon an
adjoiner's land. They are as applicable to unknown subsurface streams
as they are to filtrations and percolations through - small interstices.
Neither can be defined water courses, though they may be definable.
And in Lybe's Afieal (1884), lo6 Pa. 626, GORDON, J.,
said, in delivering the .opinion:
The rule is, thatwherever the stream is so hidden in the earth that its
course is not discoverable from the surface, there can be no such thing as
a prescription in favor of an adjacent proprietor to have an uninterrupted
flow of such stream through the land of his neighbor.
12. Known and defined subterranean streams governed by
law ab licable to surface water course.
Where, however, a subterranean stream flows in a known
and well defined course, as is frequently the case in limestone
regions, then the law with regard to it, is the same as that
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-with reference to surface streams and the rule, aqua curril,
et debet currere, 21t soleba currere, applies. This is dearly
set forth in the masterly opinion in Whealey v. Baugh
(1855), 25 Pa. 528, and was acted upon in MTetstone v.
Bowser (1857), 29 Id. 59. This position is supported by
the following cases, in all of which it is recognized, although
in some the Court did not regard the alleged stream to be
sufficiently well defined to come within the rule: Grand
Junction Canal Co.v. Shugar(I87I), L. R. 6Ch. App. 483; Cole
Silver Aing Co. v. Virginia and Gold Hill Water Co.
(1871), U. S. C. CL D. Nev., I Saw. 470; .Hansonv. MfcCue
(1871), 42 Cal. 303 ; Taylor v. Welck (1876), 6 Ore. 198;
HaleV. McLea (1879), 53 Cal. 578 ; Shivelyv. Hume (188I),
io Ore. 76; S/rail v. Brown (i881), 16 Nev. 317; Bur-
rouglis v. Saterlee(I885), 67 Iowa 396; Crossv. Kit/s (1886),
69 Cal. 217; Van Wycklen v. Brooklyn (1886), 48 N. Y. S.
C. 418; Redman v. Forman (1885), 83 Ky. 214; Colrck v.
Swiaburne (1887), 105 N. Y. 503.
13. Law of subterranean water under Code in Georgia.
The law of Georgia with reference to the diversion of the
water of underground streams, appears to be peculiar. The
Code of that State declares that:
3oi9. The course of a stream of water underground and its exact
condition before its first use, are so difficult of ascertainment, that tres-
pass cannot be brought for any supposed interference with the rights of a
proprietor.
This section came before the Supreme Court for interpre-
tation in Sadler v. Lee (I88O), 66 Ga. 45, in which case it
was alleged that the stream whose diversion was complained
of, was, for the greater part, an underground stream but with
its course and direction distinctly marked and, at intervals,
running above ground "visible to any observer acquainted
with such streams." In delivering the opinion of the Court,
CRAw FOR, J., said:
The evident intent and meaning of this Act is to declare that where
water is underground, even though it may be a stream, and if its condi-
tion and course are not to be fixed and ascertained, then no supposed in-
terference with the right of a proprietor will authorize a suit for trespass.
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But suppose a case arises after the firs4 use of the water running in a
stream, though mostly underground, with its course and direction dis-
tinctly marked and at intervals running above ground and visible to any
observer acquainted with such streams; and suppose that heavy invest-
ments have been made to utilize this stream of water and that profits aris-
ing therefrom have been enjoyed for a quarter of a century, or for even a
!.horter time, shall it be held that such proprietary rights are to be cut off
and the property itself destroyed by construing the Act adversely to such
proprietor. We cannot so hold [and, relying on LEwis, C. J., in Wheatly
v. Baugh and PARKE, B., in Dickinson v. Grand junction Canal Co.], so
that both upon reason and authority we hold that the proper construction
of our Act is, that where the exact course and condition of a stream of
water after its first use are well defined and ascertained and the interfer-
ence with the rights of the proprietor using the water of this stream is not
such as is supposed butfiositive and certain, then trespass lies.
This interpretation of the Code takes away the appar-
ent peculiarity and places the law of Georgia on a plane
with the common law as ordinarily understood.
.r4 . Act forbidding waste of subterranean waters in Colo-
rado.
The only act affecting the use of subterranean waters, be-
side the Georgia Act just cited, unless we consider as such an
act for the enc6uragement of the sinking of artesian wells
by an award of State bounties (Nevada Act, March 5, 1887,
Laws, page i19), or providing for a system of such wells under
State supervision (Dakota T. Act, March 7, 1887, Laws, ch.
7, page :5), is the Act of the State of Colorado, passed April
4, 1887 (Laws, pages 52-3), entitled:
An Act to regulate the use of artesian wells, and to prevent the waste
of subterranean waters in the State, and prescribing penalties for a vio-
lation of the provisions hereof.
SEcTio- x. Any artesian well which is not tightly cased, capped, or
furnished with such mechanical appliances as will readily and effectively
arrest and prevent the flow of water from such well, is hereby declared to
be a public nuisance. The owner, tenant or occupant of the land upon
which such well is situated, who causes, permits, or suffers such public
nuisance, or suffers or permits it to remain or continue, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
SEc. 2. Any person owning, possessing or occupying any land upon
which is situated an artesian well, who causes, suffers or permits the
water to unnecessarily flow from such well, or to go to waste, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Suc. 3. An artesian well is defined, for the purposes of this Act, to be
any artificial well, the waters of which, if properly cased, will flow con-
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tinually over the natural surface of the ground adjacent to such well, at
any season of the year. Provided, Nothing in this Act shall apply to
water flowing from mining shafts.
SEc. 4. Waste is defined, for the purpose of this Act, to be the causing,
suffering or permitting the waters flowing from such well to run into any
river, creek or other natural water course, superficial or underground
channel, bayou, or into any sewer, street, road, highway, or upon the
land of any person other than that of the owners of such, well, or upon
the public lands of the United States, or of the State of Colorado, unless
it be used thereon for the purpose and in the manner that it may be law-
fhlly used upon the land of the owner of such well; Provided, That this
section shall not be [so] construed as to prevent the use of such waters for
the proper irrigation of trees standing along or upon any street, road or
highway, or for ornamental ponds or fbuntains, or propagation of fish, or
for agricultural purposes when irrigation is not practicable by any other
means.
The remaining sections prescribe the penalty and the
method of enforcing it, and also provide for the keeping of
records of the depth and thickness of the different strata
penetrated. HENRY BUDD.
Philadelphia.
[To the preceding interesting article may be aded these addi-
tional references to briefer essays upon the same important subject:
Ballardv. Tomlinson has been justified by Judge BUN-UTi in his annota-
tion to the case: 24 AmERIcAN LAW RIGISTER 638-4
o , upon the wild
animal theory that the defendants were liable for the escape of their sew-
age without regard to the mode of transmission. Numerous cases are
cited by the annotator. The liability was recognized in Kentucky in Kix-
sard v. Standard Oil Co., January 25, i8go, where Ballard v. Tomlinson
was followed, upon the principle that "one must so use his property as
nQt to injure his neighbor." Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co. is
briefly annotated by Judge R.DEiELD in 3 AMBRICAN LAW REGISTER
238-4o, with a reference to a summary review of the English decisions in
The LoxdonJurist of November 28, 1863. Brain v. Marfell, reported in
2o Amemc&N LAw R GIST R 93-7, is briefly annotated by Judge BzN-
NxTT upon the question of malice in cutting off percolations, though
nothing more definite is concluded than by Mr. BUDD, sufira, page 251.
Rights in Subtrranean Waters is a valuable leading article in 2 AmER-
ICAN LAw REGISTER (1862), 65-76, by Hon. Emory Washburn, author of
thewell-known textbook on Easements. The writerdidnot seek toexhaust
the cases then decided, but rather to go only so far into the examination
as to be able to deduce propositions. The most important of these is that
the doctrine of prescriptive rights cannot properly be applied to the en-
joyment of water percolating through the earth.-ED.
